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An Unfortunate Case of Anglo-Saxon Parochialism?1 
 
I am writing this at the end of August 2016. The United Kingdom’s advisory referendum on 
European Union membership is now two months’ past. Since then, this country has replaced a 
Prime Minister, our main opposition party has entered a full scale internal conflict, and a 
Summer Olympics has been completed with great success for Team GB.2 In these two months, 
the mania and emotion of the immediate aftermath of the referendum result has quietened, no 
doubt helped by the Parliamentary recess over the Summer. What has remained is the 
uncertainty over what exactly ‘Brexit’ is, how it will be effected (if at all), and what the future 
holds for both the UK and the European Union.  
 It was not meant to be this way. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, the future looked very bright for the continent of Europe, and for the 
institution which became the European Union. Free markets and democracy had won. The 
threat of global nuclear war had abated, and countries around the world looked forward to the 
peace dividend which they would benefit from. Twenty-five years later, and the European 
Union could be viewed by a disinterested observer as a resounding success. Ex-Communist 
countries have been integrated into the biggest customs union and common market on the 
planet. Democracy dominates the continent of Europe as a system of government, and the 
Schengen agreement had removed internal borders from much of continental Europe. A war in 
Europe has never seemed so far away. And yet. And yet.  
 What does the UK’s vote to leave represent? Why is it that the news media and 
politicians across the continent are talking about a crisis for the EU, and even whispering about 
the beginning of the end if no reforms are made? How could the UK do this? These questions 
will generate millions of words of print (and scores of doctoral theses) in years to come. My 
reflections on the debate over Brexit relate to whether, in fact, there were any ‘ideals’ or bonds 
of solidarity which brought the 28 Member States together in the first place, or whether these 
bonds were far more tenuous than at first appreciated, especially when seen from this side of 
the English Channel. What follows is my attempt to add my own commentary to what has been 
the most momentous event of my lifetime.  
 The UK’s relationship with the European Union has always been complex, and broadly 
based on a form of cost-benefit analysis. The UK is a country which, in many ways, is still 
coming to terms with the loss of its Empire, its influence and its power during the twentieth 
century. It is a nation which has had an almost unique history amongst nation states. It never 
defined itself – what it means to be ‘British’ – through an independence movement or rebellion. 
It was always the coloniser, never the colonised. Nor has it experienced wars on its soil in the 
same way as its European neighbours; being an island nation, it has sent troops to Europe but 
not been conquered by troops from Europe for nearly a thousand years. Nor has it been swept 
up in Revolution or civil war, like many countries around the world. Still with a monarchy 
which can trace its ancestry back over a thousand years, it stood apart from France, Germany 
and others when they experienced their own revolutions which led to new constitutions, new 
ideas, new movements and national spirits to be born. Evolution (very slow evolution), rather 
than revolution is the order of the day. Tradition and history therefore gains even more 
importance for the UK. Without a founding event or historical epoch, all the nation has is its 
very lengthy existence to define itself by.  
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 Now, this history is skewed and selective (and, in many respects, plain wrong), but it is 
important not to underestimate the power of this narrative in the British psyche. The Revolution 
of 1688 is conveniently explained away (we invited a new King to take over!), invasions are 
ignored (including the Dutch and German soldiers who invaded with William III in 1688), and 
civil wars are denied (euphemistically described as ‘Troubles’ when they exist in Northern 
Ireland). Even more importantly, this narrative could be seen as not even being ‘British’. The 
Welsh, Scots and Irish nations each have their own experiences of subjugation under the 
English Crown, either through abolition (Wales), occupation (Ireland) or economic union 
(Scotland). In this sense, the ‘British’ narrative could be argued to be an ‘English’ one. To be 
slightly crueller, it is not too unfair to state that the English are one of the few peoples never to 
face up to what it means to be ‘English’. Always defining themselves through being the 
coloniser over an Empire that the Sun never set on, all of a sudden the English and British have 
had to come to terms with their new status in the family of nations. 
 In this sense, the title of this commentary reflects my own view of the UK’s relationship 
to ‘Europe’, both in reality and in ideology. It is inspired from a critical description of A V 
Dicey’s account of the rule of law,3 an account which has dominated Anglo-American 
approaches to law and justice for well over a century. This is a view of Europe which sees 
Britain as related to, but separate from the family of nations which generally are classified under 
that vowel-heavy six-letter word. It is also a view of Europe which, in my view, is coloured by 
the UK’s own unique history – one which was always (literally) on the boundary of the tumults 
and internecine conflicts of the continent. Whilst it is correct that there were underlying causes 
of the Leave vote, in my view these catalysts cannot be seen as separate from an underlying 
view of ‘Europe’ pervasive on these shores.  
 The title I have used was also used by David Dyzenhaus in 2005 to refer to a judgment 
delivered by a UK House of Lords judge, Lord Hoffmann, in the case of A and others, more 
commonly known as the ‘Belmarsh Detainees’ case.4 Lord Hoffmann’s judgment is interesting 
to me, not least for illustrating a certain point of view of ‘Europe’ (and in this case ‘European 
law’) which I feel has been reflected in many of the comments and approaches of the Leave 
campaign both before and after the June referendum.  
 The details of A can be succinctly stated. After the terrorist attacks on America in 2001, 
the Labour Government of the day passed a statute allowing for foreign terrorist suspects to be 
detained without charge or trial. This detention was challenged through the courts. The lawyers 
for the detainees, knowing that courts had upheld similar measures as being valid under the law 
of England during World War Two, instead based their challenge on the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR). In declaring that the detention without trial of suspected foreign 
terrorists was unlawful, Lord Hoffman asserted that there was no state of emergency existing 
which meant that the government lacked the justification to detain anyone without trial or 
charge. He also wrote the lines picked up by the news media, declaring that: “The real threat to 
the life of the nation … comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these”.5 Lord Hoffmann 
clearly declared that any power of indefinite detention “is not compatible with [the UK’s] 
constitution”.6 
 What Lord Hoffmann failed to mention to justify his reasoning (which all the other 
judges in the case did), was the Human Rights Act 1998, through which the UK courts can 
directly apply the rights protected by the ECHR. Instead, he felt that he did not need to rely 
upon European Law; the English common law (with all its history and wisdom gained through 
the centuries) provided all the answers required. However, this reliance on the virtues of Albion 
remained problematic. As David Dyzenhaus noted, Lord Hoffmann’s argument rested on the 
                                                          
3 Judith Skhlar, ‘Political Theology and the Rule of Law’ in Judith Skhlar, Political Thought & Political Thinkers 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p.26.  
4 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 WLR 87 (HL).  
5 A, para. 97.  
6 A, para. 97.  
proposition that detention without charge was unlawful because the UK government had not 
shown that there was a state of emergency.7 Therefore, if the government could have rationally 
shown that a state of emergency had existed, then the judiciary should defer to the government 
and executive and not stand in the way of their decision.8 In contrast, the other judges all agreed 
that there was a state of emergency, but even conceding this made clear that the ECHR placed 
limits on governmental action, which the government had exceeded. In short, it can be said that 
Lord Hoffmann, through an unnecessary reification of the virtues of English law, had in fact 
set the stage for larger problems down the line. Thankfully, his was a minority judgment in the 
case.  
 It may appear strange to start a commentary on the ‘Brexit’ decision and its relation to 
the fall of the Soviet Union with a decade old human rights case, but I think that Lord 
Hoffmann’s judgment case light upon a wider view of the merits (or otherwise) of ‘Europe’ 
prevalent in the UK. Lord Hoffmann’s approach to favour the English common law over and 
above any European alternative (and the burden which is places the English lawyer under) is 
reflected in the 19th century jurist (and cousin of Dicey and uncle of Virginia Woolf) James 
Fitzjames Stephen’s view that:  
Our law is in fact the sum and substance of what we have to teach them. It is, so to 
speak, the gospel of the English, and it is a compulsory gospel which admits of no 
dissent and no disobedience.9 
 
Nor is this opinion of English and British supremacy limited to the law. In the political sphere, 
the self-evident pre-eminence of Albion was announced by Margaret Thatcher in 1999:  
My friends, we are quite the best country in Europe. I've been told I have to be careful 
about what I say and I don't like it. In my lifetime all our problems have come from 
mainland Europe and all the solutions have come from the English-speaking nations 
across the world.10 
 
Such statements cast doubt on the narratives of the EU which place a motive shared by all 
Member States at its heart. But the history of the UK’s accession also points to deep suspicions 
which came to the fore this Summer. The UK’s perceived hostility towards ‘Europe’ was 
reflected in its original attitude to the European Economic Community (EEC) back in the 
1950’s. The UK was not part of the original Treaty of Rome, and did not send a minister to the 
preliminary summits and discussions which led to the Treaty’s formulation. Instead, Russell 
Bretherton, an Under-Secretary from the Department of Trade, attended.  
 Jean-François Deniau, a French statesman present at the negotiations, recounted how 
Bretherton had spent many months sitting through the proposals of which the government of 
Harold Macmillan of the time were sceptical. Deniau noted that finally, one day Bretherton had 
had enough, and rose to deliver a speech:  
Messieurs, I have followed your work with interest, and sympathetically. I have to tell 
you that the future Treaty which you are discussing a) has no chance of being agreed; 
b) if it were agreed, it would have no chance of being ratified; c) if it were ratified, it 
would have no chance of being applied. And please note that, if it were applied, it would 
be totally unacceptable to Britain. You speak of agriculture, which we don't like, of 
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power over customs, which we take exception to, and of institutions, which horrifies us. 
Monsieur le president, messieurs, au revoir et bonne chance.11 
 
Whether Deniau’s account is accurate is disputed; Bretherton may never have uttered those 
words. Yet it was true that British officials were concerned about the UK joining this economic 
community. Bretherton made this clear in an official communique:  
We have, in fact, the power to guide the conclusions of this conference in almost any 
direction we like, but beyond a certain point we cannot exercise that power without 
ourselves becoming, in some measure, responsible for the results.12 
 
The suspicion of centralised authorities in Europe was a main driver behind the UK’s non-
participation in the Community for over a decade and a half. In part because of this suspicion, 
the UK only joined the EEC in 1973, alongside Ireland. This was in contrast to the UK’s other 
post-war multilateralism – the UK was (and still is) a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council, a founding member of NATO, and it was the UK Government which helped 
to draft the ECHR. Following Fitzjames Stephen’s lead, the UK was happy to bring the rule of 
law and human rights to other European countries; in line with Thatcher’s view, the UK was 
happy to stand shoulder to shoulder with the USA and help defend Europe from the threat of 
communism and the Soviet Union. What the UK was not so happy doing was pooling aspects 
of sovereignty through the Common Market, moving decisions from Westminster to Brussels.  
 Yet the UK was a member of the Common Market, and remained a member through the 
1980’s when the EEC expanded, with the former dictatorships of Spain, Portugal and Greece 
joining. With an expanding Europe, the EEC made moves to reduce tariff barriers and 
committed to creating a ‘single market’ comprising of free movement of goods, capital, services 
and (most importantly) people by 1992. The UK played its part in passing the Single European 
Act when its Prime Minister, one Margaret Thatcher, signed on behalf of the country in 1986. 
Despite her ambivalence towards ‘Europe’, she was a keen supporter of the single market and 
its economic benefits.  
 In fact, it was Thatcher as Prime Minister who championed the expansion of the EEC. 
In 1988, Thatcher delivered a speech in Bruges to the College of Europe. In the speech, Thatcher 
laid bare the British relationship to ‘Europe’ which underpinned the referendum result this June 
and will shape the exit negotiations in years to come. Europe, Thatcher argued, “is not the 
creation of the Treaty of Rome”.13 Whilst acknowledging the UK’s debt to European culture, 
which ‘shaped the nation’, Thatcher made clear that the EEC should be built through the 
“willing and active collaboration between independent sovereign states”.14 To this end, even 
the Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party in the 1980’s and 1990’s wished for a ‘wider not 
deeper Europe’. By expanding eastwards, the EEC (later the EU) would become so large that it 
would be impossible to pursue a goal of political union. Alongside this, many British politicians 
felt that integrating ex-Soviet and Iron Curtain states into the single market would aid the 
democratising process in these countries. Thatcher was one of them. In the Bruges speech, she 
noted that the EEC should “never forget that east of the Iron Curtain, people who once enjoyed 
a full share of European culture, freedom and identity have been cut off from their roots. We 
shall always look on Warsaw, Prague and Budapest as great European cities”.15 In 2002, 
Conservative MEP Roger Helmer (who later defected to UKIP) stated that:  
                                                          
11 Michael Maclay, ‘Historical Notes: Mr Bretherton’s retreat from Europe’, The Independent (29 August 1999) 
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/historical-notes-mr-brethertons-retreat-from-europe-
1118343.html; Jean-François Deniau, ‘L'Europe Interdite’, Le Monde (27 October 1991). 
12 CAB 134/1044, R Bretherton (BT) to F F Turnbull (T), 4 August 1955.  
13 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech to the College of Europe ("The Bruges Speech")”, (20 September 1988), 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
Tory policy on enlargement is clear. We are in favour of it, for three reasons. First, we 
owe a moral debt to the countries of central and eastern Europe, which were allowed to 
fall under the pall of communism after the second world war. Second, by entrenching 
democracy and the rule of law in eastern Europe, we ensure stability and security for 
the future. Third, an extra hundred million people in our single market may be a short-
term liability, but long term will contribute to growth and prosperity.16 
 
The contours of the British political debate around Europe – the preeminent position the UK 
placed itself in with relation to the rest of the continent, its suspicion of centralised powers in 
the EEC and EU, and its desire to embrace the single market through expanding EU 
membership – shaped not just the EU referendum debate but all debates around the EU for the 
past decade. What proved to be the catalyst for the vote to Leave were two events – the 2008 
global recession and market crash, and the previous Labour Government’s approach to the 
eastern expansion of the EU.  
 In 2004, ten countries of the former Soviet Union and Iron Curtain joined the EU. It 
could be said that this act was the final victory of the capitalist West in the Cold War. Not only 
had the Soviet Union dissolved, but an economic boom had occurred after the ‘end of history’ 
in the ‘roaring nineties’.17 Stock markets were booming, free trade and globalisation were the 
orders of the day, and there was seemingly no end to the bull market. Then UK Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Gordon Brown declared in 2007 that there would be no return to a “boom and 
bust” economy of the past.18 The gains from eastern expansion, and access to another 100 
million consumers, were clear even a decade prior to accession.19 Nevertheless, there were 
dangers. Even in 1995, one academic noted that “serious political or economic turmoil in the 
East could lead to mass migrations and harm the confidence of investors throughout Europe”.20 
 The mass migration occurred, but not because of any serious political or economic 
turmoil. Unlike France and Germany, who took advantage of transitional restrictions on free 
movement of persons when the 2004 accession occurred, the UK government relaxed 
immigration controls to these new EU migrants. This was an economic decision, in line with 
successive UK Governments approach to Europe – namely, in support of the single market, but 
not in favour of political union: 
With an expanded European Union there is an accessible and mobile workforce already 
contributing to our growing economy, closing many gaps experienced by employers. In 
a changing environment where our European commitments provide many opportunities 
for the UK to benefit from this new source of labour (...) [o]ur starting point is that 
employers should look first to recruit from the UK and the expanded EU before 
recruiting migrants from outside the EU.21 
 
The peoples of Eastern Europe were thus to be used as a source of cheap labour to bolster the 
booming UK economy. Yet the background to this boom was misleading. Not all individuals 
were benefitting from the economic boom. In the US, from 1980 to 2013, the richest 1% saw 
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their income increase by 142% and their share of national income double from 10% to 20%.22 
Likewise, in the UK whilst the richest 10% saw their incomes more than double from 1968 to 
2008, for the poorest 10% saw their wages increase by 20% over the same period, with no real 
terms increase from 2002 to 2008.23 The dangers of this inequality was perhaps best explained 
by Thomas Piketty, who stated that:  
When the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and income … 
capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically 
undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based.24  
 
In other words, capital (unearned wealth, exemplified by the house price explosion in the UK) 
was fast outstripping income, leading to huge increases in inequality. This was not an inevitable 
consequence. Rather, it was caused by political policies repeated across North America and 
Europe, lending evidence to Piketty’s assertion that “[t]he history of the distribution of wealth 
has always been deeply political”.25   
 Then the roof caved in, and a perfect storm was unleashed. The 2008 financial crisis, as 
is still evident, badly affected the Eurozone. Long regarded with suspicion from Albion, 
currency union was seen as driven by politics, not economics, and as the first stage to the 
complete political union that the UK had long resisted (and in many quarters, feared). The harsh 
approach taken by the EU against Spain, Ireland and Greece (amongst others), and the perceived 
overriding of expressions of outrage and dissent by EU citizens to ensure the single currency 
did not fracture, further increased criticism of the EU and its institutions. Decisions were being 
made by an organisation with a democratic deficit that bound elected governments across the 
continent.26 Such is this democratic deficit that it has led to former Soviet dissidents making 
unflattering comparisons with the Soviet Union.27  
 What the financial crisis led to in the UK was the election of a Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government who embarked upon a radical austerity regime. Made up of 
deep spending cuts in the main, without the Keynesian stimulus package demanded by many 
economists,28 the austerity measures were designed to reduce the UK’s public accounts deficit. 
These measures have led to tepid growth, with public debt doubling since 2010 and the balance 
of payments running at record deficits. In addition, the austerity policies fell predominantly on 
the poorest in the UK – those who saw their wages increase so timidly during the boom, felt the 
pain the most during the bust.29 Economic stagnation, cuts to social security and public services, 
falling incomes, and rising unemployment combined to create a deeply damaging situation in 
which millions struggled to make ends meet.30 Conversely, the well off, those without children, 
those who did not receive state benefits, and those who most likely benefitted from the 
economic boom, did not feel the brunt of the cuts. Again Piketty is instructive:  
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[T]he dynamics of wealth distribution reveal powerful mechanisms pushing 
alternatively toward convergence and divergence … there is no natural, spontaneous 
process to prevent destabilizing, inegalitarian forces from prevailing permanently.31 
 
Despite the UK’s economic recovery being worse than it needed to be through a self-inflicted 
wound, it remained in a (relatively) better position than the Eurozone. The result of this was an 
increase in net migration to the UK, especially from EU citizens. This was driven by the 
Eurozone crisis – from 150,000 migrants a year from the EU in 2012 to over 250,000 a year in 
2015.32 In the background too remained the refugee crisis. Even though very few of those 
fleeing violence in the Middle East and North Africa reached the UK, images of thousands of 
refugees arriving in ‘Europe’ (it was almost always left ambiguous in the press), queuing at 
borders, climbing over fences and heading ever westwards became synonymous with the free 
movement of persons guaranteed by the EU Treaties. This was taken advantage of by the (now 
infamous) “Breaking Point” poster unveiled by the UKIP leader Nigel Farage a few weeks 
before the referendum. The perfect storm had thus been created – longstanding British 
suspicions about the EU and its centralizing tendencies, the fears about immigration, concerns 
about a lack of jobs and opportunities, disenfranchisement with the mainstream political parties, 
and a schism in the populace with the result laid bare.  
 Opinion polls published shortly after the vote appears to support the view that it was 
those ‘left behind’ in the periods of economic growth, who were also most affected by austerity, 
who cast the decisive votes in the referendum. Brexit voters are twice as likely to feel that their 
local area doesn’t get its fair share of Britain’s economic success, and that their local area has 
been neglected by politicians, and that government does not listen to their concerns.33 58% of 
Leave voters felt that life in Britain today is worse than it was 30 years ago; 73% of Remain 
voters felt it is better. There was a clear correlation with education and social class – the better 
off and better educated the voter was, the likelier it was that they would vote Remain. By large 
majorities, voters who saw multiculturalism, feminism, the Green movement, globalization and 
immigration as forces for good voted to remain in the EU; those who saw them as a force for 
ill voted by even larger majorities to leave. Again, suspicion about the EU and a perceived 
democratic threat to the UK’s traditions remained a strong influence. Nearly half (49%) of leave 
voters said the biggest single reason for wanting to leave the EU was “the principle that 
decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK”. One third (33%) said the main reason was 
that leaving “offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own 
borders”. Even among Remain voters, only 9% said the main reason for their vote was “a strong 
attachment to the EU and its shared history, culture and traditions”.34 
 Despite the shock with which the Leave vote was received, especially by the markets, 
it was not particularly surprising given the context. Again, Piketty’s words seem prescient:  
The concrete, physical reality of inequality is visible to the naked eye and naturally 
inspires sharp but contradictory political judgments. Peasant and noble, worker and 
factory owner, waiter and banker: each has his or her own unique vantage point and sees 
important aspects of how other people live and what relations of power and domination 
exist between social groups, and these observations shape each person’s judgment of 
what is and is not just.35 
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 The history of inequality is shaped by the way economic, social and political actors view 
what is just and what is not, as well as by the relative power of those actors and the 
collective choices that result.36 
 
So what now? 
 What is clear to me is the cognitive disconnect which exists between both sides in the 
debate, and also between the leading voices on each side and the very people who voted for 
Brexit. Since the result was announced there have been many ardent ‘Brexiteers’ who have 
advocated leaving not just the EU but the single market as soon as possible so that Britain can 
forge trade deals with countries around the world and become (in the words of one) a 
“buccaneering offshore low-tax nation”.37 Lord Lawson (a former Chancellor) claimed that 
Brexit will allow Britain to negotiate new favourable trade deals and ensure the ones she has 
remain ‘unchanged’.38 The spirit of Thatcher and Fitzjames Stephen remains strong. These 
pronouncements infer that the UK can ensure that free movement of persons will end, that the 
EU will accede to the UK’s requests for trade, and that the UK will become even more 
successful now it has thrown off the yoke of the EU. Yet within the Brexit camp, there are the 
‘soft Brexiteers’ who argue for single market access, stating that this is crucial for the UK’s 
economy. Single market access of course means accepting free movement of persons. It is not 
yet clear which path the UK will travel down.39 Even then, what is good economically is not 
necessarily good politically. There is the very real prospect that the UK (and by extension its 
people) will not be given a good deal. If the UK can show that it can leave the EU and get a 
better deal outside of the Union, then what message will that send to the other Member States? 
 Just as loudly the ‘Remainers’ have made their objections. Parliament must get its say! 
This was only an advisory referendum – it is not binding! People were lied to – all the experts 
declared that this would be a disaster!40 True, it was galling to see the Justice Minister, Michael 
Gove, dismiss the warnings by economists and others in advance of the vote with a 
proclamation that: “people in this country have had enough of experts”.41 Yet is there not 
something more problematic with the notion that the People have made an egregious error, and 
that their decision should be ignored? True, the question was ambiguous. People had different 
reasons and motivations for voting to Leave. True, the vote was close – four points. But this is 
still around 1.4m votes. A four-point win in a US Presidential election would not be this 
contentious. True, this issue was complex. The implications are enormous, spanning issues 
including international trade law, the World Trade Organisation, the status of EU law in the 
UK, the future of the UK constitution (unwritten as it is), and the future of the UK itself. You 
would have to have experts to guide your way through that minefield. But to come back to 
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Piketty again: “Democracy will never be supplanted by a republic of experts – and that is a very 
good thing”.42 
 In The Communist Manifesto, Marx wrote that “A spectre is haunting Europe – the 
spectre of communism”. Today, perhaps it is correct to state that the spectre haunting Europe 
is the future of Europe itself. Income inequality, austerity and financial crises and the refugee 
crisis have led to the UK voting to leave the European project. The unique history of the UK, 
and its own unique take on the merits of itself and the demerits of ‘Europe’ have made it the 
first to leave the club. Yet across Europe, nationalist parties are surging in opinion polls, and 
anti-EU sentiment is growing. Perhaps the greatest lesson the fall of the Soviet Union can teach 
us is what happens when an ossified, out of touch, undemocratic bureaucratic regime runs into 
the demands of people to ‘take back control’. 
 Does this mean that the European Union will come to an end? No, I don’t think so. I 
voted to Remain, and am fearful of the future prospects for my own country. Yet for all the talk 
about Britain’s new place in the world, the future of EU reform, the future of trade deals, 
renegotiations, and the importance of finding the best possible solution to this situation, we 
could end up missing the most important lesson of all. That what we should all do in this 
country, and across the EU, is speak to those millions of people who feel like they have been 
abandoned by this country, ‘Europe’, globalisation and austerity, and to hear their stories and 
what they have to say. Only then can we start to think about whether there are shared values 
and principles which could form the basis for a European politics of the future.  
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